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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Brandon Gould appeals from the judgment entered upon the district 
court's order dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
Following allegations by Gould's seven-year-old daughter, A.G.1 1, that her 
father "always touches [her] in private places," and that he "licked [her] potty," a 
grand jury indicted Gould on one count of lewd conduct and one count of sexual 
abuse of a child under the age of 16. (#35797, CARES Interview Summary 
Report, attached to PSI; #35797 R., pp.16-17.2) A jury found Gould guilty of the 
lewd conduct charge but was unable to reach a unanimous verdict on the sexual 
abuse charge. (#35797 R., pp.87-88.) The court imposed a unified 10-year 
sentence with three years fixed. (#35797 R., pp.106-107.) On direct appeal, 
Gould raised a single claim: that his sentence is excessive. (R., p.133.) The 
Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. 
Gould filed a timely pro se petition for post-conviction relief in which he 
raised the following claims: (1) prosecutorial misconduct for withholding "newly 
1 Gould has two daughters who share the same initials - A.G. (Tr., p.10, Ls.15-
24.) For clarity, the victim in the lewd conduct case will be referred to as A.G.1 
and Gould's other daughter will be referred to as A.G.2. 
1 
discovered exculpatory evidence" that A G.1 's mother, Kristen, "had previously 
and falsely alleged sexual abuse on one of her children"; (2) ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel; and (3) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. 
(R., pp.5-10.) Gould also filed a motion for the appointment of counsel, which 
the district court granted. (R., pp.160-162, 169.) 
The state filed an answer and motion for summary dismissal after which 
Gould filed a motion to amend the petition and "stay" the proceedings in order to 
allow post-conviction counsel to "review a copy of the presentence investigation 
report, receive and review transcripts, and prepare an amended petition" "after a 
discussion of issues with appointed counsel." (R., pp.177-180, 198-201, 204.) 
The court granted Gould's motion and Gould subsequently filed an "Addendum 
to Petition for Post-Conviction Relief." (R., pp.205, 210-212.) In the addendum, 
Gould raised additional allegations of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate 
counsel. (R., pp.210-212.) The state filed an answer and motion for summary 
dismissal with respect to the addendum. (R., pp.213-217.) 
After Gould filed an "Objection to Motion to Dismiss," the court entered an 
order concluding Gould was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his ineffective 
assistance of trial and appellate counsel claims, but granting the state's motion 
2 Pursuant to Gould's motion, the Idaho Supreme Court entered an order 
augmenting the record with "the Clerk's Record and Reports Transcripts in 
Supreme Court Docket No. 35797-2012, State v. Gould." (Order to Augment the 
Record and Suspend the Briefing Schedule, dated October 17, 2012.) Although 
not expressly noted, the order also appears to grant Gould's request to augment 
the record with the transcript of the grand jury hearing and the presentence 
investigation report. (Id.) 
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for summary dismissal of the prosecutorial misconduct claim on the ground that 
it "could have been and should have been raised on appeal." (R., pp.226-234.) 
Following an evidentiary hearing, the court made findings on the record 
and entered a written order dismissing Gould's petition. (Tr., pp.188, L.24 -
p.194, L.22, p.195, L.18 - p.199, L.4; R., p.244.) In its order the court stated: 
'The Court listened to the evidence and testimony presented at the hearing and 
found all witnesses who testified to be credible. The Court finds neither Matthew 
Roker, Mr. Gould's trial attorney, nor Justin Curtis, Mr. Gould's appellate 
attorney, were deficient in their representation of Mr. Gould." (R., p.244.) Gould 
timely appealed. (R., pp.246-248.) 
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ISSUES 
Gould states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err in applying the incorrect standards of 
"negligence," "professional malpractice," and "making mistakes 
so fundamental that it was as though Mr. Gould had no counsel 
at all" to the question of whether trial and appellate counsel had 
rendered deficient performance? 
2. Applying the proper standard, should post-conviction relief be 
granted because trial and appellate counsel were 
constitutionally ineffective? 
(Opening Brief of Appellant ("Appellant's Brief'), p.33.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Gould failed to show the district court applied the incorrect legal 




Gould Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Petition For Post-
Conviction Relief 
Introduction 
Following an evidentiary hearing on Gould's ineffective assistance of trial 
and appellate counsel claims, the district court denied relief, concluding Gould 
failed to meet his burden of proving deficient performance by either trial or 
appellate counsel.3 (R., p.244; Tr., pp.189-199.) Gould contends the district 
court applied incorrect legal standards in reaching this conclusion and that 
application of the correct standard shows the district court erred in denying post-
conviction relief. (Appellant's Brief, pp.33-41.) Review and application of the 
relevant legal standards and the evidence presented shows both of Gould's 
arguments fail. 
B. Standard Of Review 
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel presents mixed questions of 
law and fact. A petitioner for post-conviction relief has the burden of proving, by 
a preponderance of the evidence, the allegations on which her claim is based. 
Idaho Criminal Rule 57(c); Estes v. State, 111 Idaho 430, 436, 725 P.2d 135, 
141 ( 1986). A trial court's decision that the petitioner has not met his burden of 
proof is entitled to great weight. Sanders v. State, 117 Idaho 939, 940, 792 P.2d 
3 Having concluded that Gould failed to meet his burden of showing deficient 
performance, the district court declined to address the prejudice prong of the 
ineffective assistance of counsel standard. (Tr., p.193, Ls.8-14, p.194, Ls.14-
22.) 
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964, 965 (Ct. App. 1990). Further, the credibility of the witnesses and the weight 
to be given to the testimony are matters within the discretion of the trial court. 
Rueth v. State, 103 Idaho 74,644 P.2d 1333 (1982). 
C. The District Court Applied The Correct Legal Standard 
In order to prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a post-
conviction petitioner must demonstrate both deficient performance and resulting 
prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); State v. 
Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137, 774 P.2d 299, 307 (1989). With respect to the 
deficient performance prong, the United States Supreme Court has articulated 
the defendant's burden under Strickland as follows: 
To establish deficient performance, a person challenging a 
conviction must show that counsel's representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness. A court considering a claim 
of ineffective assistance must apply a strong presumption that 
counsel's representation was within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance. The challenger's burden is to show that 
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as 
the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. 
Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 787 (2011) (citations and quotations 
omitted). 
To establish prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding 
would have been different. Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 787. "A reasonable probability 
is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." kl (citations 
and quotations omitted). "It is not enough to show that the errors had some 
conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding." kl Rather, "[c]ounsel's 
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errors must be so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose 
result is reliable." 19.:. 
In its oral ruling, the district court articulated the applicable Strickland 
standard, stating: 
The standard that the court has to apply in making a 
decision regarding an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel 
as a ground for relief is set forth, as the attorneys well know in the 
well known case of Strickland versus Washington. It's a two-step 
analysis, and the first is to determine whether or not the trial 
attorney, and in this case not only the trial attorney but the 
appellate attorney, were ineffective in that they failed to provide 
competent legal counsel on behalf of their client. 
(Tr., p.189, Ls.12-22.) 
Although the court set forth the Strickland standard at the outset of its 
ruling, Gould nevertheless claims the court "applied a variety of standards to 
determine deficient performance including whether counsels' errors were so 
fundamental that it was as if [Gould] did not have counsel. The court equated 
with [sic] this standard with negligence, professional negligence, and 
professional malpractice." (Appellant's Brief, p.34.) Gould does not provide any 
citation to the record in his argument section to indicate exactly which statements 
he takes issue with, presumably leaving the state and Court to ascertain that 
information from elsewhere in his brief. However, neither the state nor the Court 
should be required to sort through Gould's brief and ascertain the parameters of 
his argument. See Idaho State Bar v. Clark, 153 Idaho 349, _, 283 P.3d 96, 
103 (2012) ("this Court will not search the record on appeal for unspecified 
error"); State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) (It is well 
settled that a party waives an issue on appeal if either authority or argument is 
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lacking.); United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (th Cir. 1991) ("Judges are 
not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs."). 
Assuming Gould's complaint is based on the quotations included in 
Section 8, "Procedural History and Statement of Facts," subsection 9, "Petition 
for Post Conviction Relief," Gould quotes the following words and phrases used 
by the court in its oral ruling: "negligent," "fell below the standard of practice and 
the standard of care for attorneys practicing their respective professions, trial 
attorney and appellate attorney, in this community during the relevant times," 
"akin to making a mistake that was so fundamental that it was as though Mr. 
Gould had no attorney at all," "professional malpractice," and "professional 
negligence." (Appellant's Brief, pp.31-32.) Gould appears to argue that some of 
the court's statements indicate the court applied the standard from United States 
v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), which, unlike Strickland, allows for a presumption 
of prejudice under certain circumstances. (Appellant's Brief, p.34.) No 
reasonable reading of the court's comments supports Gould's claim that the 
court was erroneously applying the Cronic standard rather than Strickland. The 
court expressly noted the applicable Strickland standard and Gould's 
interpretation of the court's comments as applying some other standard is 
insufficient to show the court did not understand or apply Strickland. 
Nor do the court's comments about negligence and malpractice indicate, 
as Gould claims, that the court applied a "civil standard of negligence" rather 
than the Strickland standard the court specifically acknowledged governed its 
decision. (Appellant's Brief, pp.34-35.) Indeed, the court's comments related to 
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the standards of practice among attorneys were entirely consistent with 
Strickland and the manner in which it has been applied in other cases. As noted 
by the United States Supreme Court in Premo v. Moore, 131 S.Ct. 733 (2011), 
citing Strickland, ''The question is whether an attorney's representation 
amounted to incompetence under prevailing professional norms, not whether 
it deviated from best practices or most common custom." (Emphasis added.) 
See also Missouri v. Frye, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012) ("Though the standard 
for counsel's performance is not determined solely by reference to codified 
standards of professional practice, these standards can be important guides."); 
Steele v. State, 153 Idaho 783, _, 291 P.3d 466, 473 n.8 (Ct. App. 2012) 
(noting the petitioner's failure to "present any evidence that his attorney's 
conduct was objectively unreasonable under prevailing professional norms"). 
Gould's claim that the district court applied a "variety" of incorrect legal 
standards to his ineffective assistance of counsel claims is without merit. 
D. Gould Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Determination 
That He Failed To Prove Trial Counsel Was Deficient 
In his petition and subsequent addendum, Gould alleged his trial attorney 
was ineffective for failing to (a) "obtain pertinent medical records on both of the 
children which may have had any mention of the Chief Complaint being Sexual 
Abuse" (R., p.8); (b) "obtain school attendance records on both of petitioner's 
children during the time of the allegations being made against the petitioner" (R., 
p.8); (c) "conduct any investigation upon the Jury Pool prior to Trial" (R., p.8); (d) 
"object and challenge for cause upon selection of Juror No. 1 ... , and Juror No. 
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28 ... based upon their places of prior and/or current employment"; (e) "strike 
Juror No. 31, ... , and Juror No. 28" (R., p.8); (f) "obtain application [sic] for 
Health and Welfare Benefits made by Kristen Gould on or about September 10, 
2007" (R., p.21 O); and (g) "obtain medical records from Dr. Rand regarding a 
January 2008 visit by AG.[1] and AG.[2], minor children" (R., p.210). The court 
denied relief on all of Gould's ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims after 
concluding Gould failed to establish counsel was deficient. (Tr., p.190, L.14 -
p.193, L.14, p.195, L.18-p.199, L.4.) 
On appeal, Gould only challenges the denial of relief on his claims that 
trial counsel was ineffective in failing to obtain "[mJedical records showing a past 
history of sexual abuse allegations, especially the false sexual abuse allegation 
based on an injury nearly identical to the injury alleged in this case," and failing 
to obtain records from Health and Welfare "showing that Kristen had applied for 
welfare benefits prior to the accusations against [him]." (Appellant's Brief, pp.36-
37.) Gould contends counsel's failure to do so was "objectively unreasonable" in 
light of his defense theory at trial, which was that "Kristen was dishonest, was 
hypersensitive to issues concerning sexual abuse, controlled her children, was 
upset with [Gould], and elicited a false accusation from [AG.]." (Appellant's 
Brief, p.36.) The district court correctly concluded Gould failed to establish 
counsel was constitutionally deficient in either regard. 
"[C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a 
reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. In any 
ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly 
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assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy 
measure of deference to counsel's judgments." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. 
However, "the duty to investigate does not force defense lawyers to scour the 
globe on the off chance something will turn up; reasonably diligent counsel may 
draw a line when they have good reason to think further investigation would be a 
waste." Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 383 (2005). 
1. Medical Records 
At the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Gould introduced medical 
records from an emergency room visit A.G.2 had on March 16, 2004, 
approximately three years prior to the allegations by A.G.1. (Compare Exhibit 1 
with #35797 R., pp.16-17 (Amended Indictment alleging Gould committed lewd 
conduct against A.G.1 on or about July 2007 and sexual abuse against A.G.1 on 
or about August 2007).) Although trial counsel was aware of the hospital visit 
and explored the nature of the visit at trial, Gould contends it was objectively 
unreasonable for counsel not to request the medical records from the hospital, 
claiming the records "were obviously an avenue leading to facts relevant to the 
merits of the case." (Appellant's Brief, p.36.) Gould, however, fails to explain 
why the Sixth Amendment compelled trial counsel to subpoena medical records 
in addition to presenting testimony from Gould's sister on this point. While 
counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that it "would have been a good 
document to have when Kristen under oath said, 'I was not concerned about 
sexual abuse,"' counsel's conclusion that it would have been useful in light of 
Kristen's testimony does not mean he was deficient for failing to subpoena the 
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record in the first place. As counsel noted, he did not expect Kristen to deny that 
the purpose of the visit to the emergency room was due to a concern about 
sexual abuse and, in any event, counsel was able to present testimony through 
Gould's sister to impeach Kristen on that point. (Tr., p.163, L.18 - p.165, L.14.) 
Counsel's testimony and the court's conclusion that counsel's 
performance was not deficient for failing to subpoena the records illustrates one 
of the guiding principles in applying Strickland - counsel's actions are to be 
evaluated at the time they were undertaken, not with twenty-twenty hindsight. 
See Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 790 ("After an adverse verdict at trial even the most 
experienced counsel may find it difficult to resist asking whether a different 
strategy might have been better, and, in the course of that reflection, to magnify 
their own responsibility for an unfavorable outcome. Strickland, however, calls 
for an inquiry into the objective reasonableness of counsel's performance, not 
counsel's subjective state of mind."); State v. Manley, 142 Idaho 338, 345, 127 
P.3d 954, 961 (2005) (citations and quotations omitted) ("In assessing the 
reasonableness of attorney performance, this Court has cautioned, judicial 
scrutiny must be highly deferential and every effort must 'be made to eliminate 
the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's 
challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at 
the time."). Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139, 147, 139 P.3d 741, 749 (Ct. App. 
2006) ("While trial counsel's candor is commendable, we assess his conduct by 
way of an objective review of reasonableness under prevailing professional 
norms so as to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight.") Gould has failed to 
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establish error in the denial of relief on his claim that trail counsel was ineffective 
for failing to subpoena medical records related to A.G.2's 2004 emergency room 
visit. 
2. Health And Welfare Records 
At the evidentiary hearing, Gould introduced documents relating to 
Kristen's request for assistance through the Department of Health and Welfare. 
(Exhibits 2, 3.) Gould claims counsel was deficient in failing to obtain these 
records prior trial, again arguing the records "were an avenue leading to facts 
relevant to the merits of the case." (Appellant's Brief, p.37.) Gould's theory is 
that the records would have shown a "plan" by Kristen to falsely report abuse. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.36-37.) 
Trial counsel testified that he "knew" Kristen was "getting some benefits 
before trial," explaining it is "common" in these types of cases because "[a] lot of 
times the individual who has the children who are making the allegations don't 
have the resources anymore, so they have to get state assistance." (Tr., p.167, 
L.18 - p.168, L.1.) According to trial counsel, in all of his cases, "it's the norm 
that after the charges are filed or the allegations are made and the accused is 
separated from the family, ... the state then tries to make sure that the other 
individual is aware of what is available as far as state assistance" and will "direct 
them towards Health & Welfare." (Tr., p.168, Ls.6-17.) Counsel admitted he did 
not obtain the records but also testified that he would not necessarily use such 
information at trial even if he had because he would "expect that the jury would 
say yeah, she is in a bad spot, and so she needs to get help from Health and 
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Welfare," which could evoke sympathy from the jury. (Tr., p.168, L.24 - p.169, 
L.22.) 
The district court correctly concluded counsel was not deficient in failing to 
obtain the records from the Department of Health and Welfare. As counsel 
indicated, he was aware Kristen engaged in the normal practice of obtaining 
assistance from Health and Welfare and saw no reason to subpoena the 
records. Gould failed to prove there was anything objectively unreasonable 
about counsel's decision-making in this regard and any assertion that the 
records may have impeached Kristen on the timing of her request for assistance 
vis-a-vis A.G.1 's disclosure is speculative and premised on hindsight. 
3. Even If Counsel Was Deficient For Failing To Obtain Records, 
Gould Failed To Establish Prejudice 
Even if counsel was deficient in failing to obtain copies of the A.G.2's 
emergency room records or the Health and Welfare records, Gould failed to 
prove he was prejudiced as a result since those records would not have 
materially advanced his defense that Kristen was a liar. More importantly, the 
records would not have established A.G.1 was lying about the abuse. As trial 
counsel noted, A.G.1 's testimony was "very harmful" and, although he tried to 
highlight some of the inconsistencies, he also "vividly remember[s] her testifying 
on the stand and trying to think of a way that [he] could break in, because the 
jury was certainly captivated, and she was very emotional as she was testifying 
to the alleged acts." (Tr., p.161, Ls.15-24.) Gould's belief that there is a 
reasonable probability that a continued character assassination on A.G.1 's 
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mother would have resulted in a different outcome is not well-founded. Thus, 
any deficiency by trial counsel in pursuing more evidence on that point did not 
result in prejudice. 
E. Gould Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Determination 
That He Failed To Prove Appellate Counsel Was Deficient 
In his petition and subsequent addendum, Gould alleged appellate 
counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the following claims on appeal: (a) the 
district court abused its discretion in failing to disqualify jurors 28 and 31 (R., 
p.9); (b) the district court abused its discretion in allowing certain testimony from 
Mydell Yeager (R, p.9); (c) the district court abused its discretion in denying 
Gould's motion for a new trial (R., p.9); (d) prosecutorial misconduct in closing 
argument (R., p.1 0); and (e) a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 837 U.S. 83 
(1963), based on the state's failure to disclose "Health and Welfare and medical 
records to trial counsel" (R., p.211). As with trial counsel, the district court 
concluded Gould failed to prove appellate counsel was deficient. (Tr., p.193, 
L.15 - p.194, L.16.) Gould has failed to establish this conclusion was erroneous. 
The two-prong Strickland test for ineffective assistance of trial counsel 
also applies to claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Baxter v. 
State, 149 Idaho 859, 243 P.3d 675 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing Mintun v. State, 144 
Idaho 656,661,168 P.3d 40, 45 (Ct. App. 2007). In order to establish ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel, a petitioner has the burden of proving that his 
counsel's representation on appeal was deficient and that the deficiency was 
prejudicial. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985); Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 
15 
274, 276, 971 P.2d 727, 730 (1998). Even if a defendant requests that certain 
issues be raised on appeal, appellate counsel has no constitutional obligation to 
raise every non-frivolous issue requested by the defendant. Jones v. Barnes, 
463 U.S. 745, 751-53 (1983); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 765, 760 P.2d 
1174, 1181 (1988) (citing Jones, 463 U.S. at 751-754). The relevant inquiry is 
whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the 
defendant would have prevailed on appeal. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 
(2000); Schoger v. State, 148 Idaho 622, 629, 226 P.3d 1269, 1276 (2010) 
(citing State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548,561,199 P.3d 123,136 (2008)). 
Gould asserts appellate counsel was ineffective because the only issue 
he raised, which was that Gould's sentence is excessive, "was weak" and there 
were "stronger issues" that could have been raised. (Appellant's Brief, pp.37-
38.) The standard is not, however, whether Gould thinks there were "stronger" 
issues; the standard is whether counsel was deficient in his decision regarding 
what issues to raise and whether Gould would have prevailed on those issues. 
In any event, Gould presented almost no evidence at the evidentiary hearing to 
support his claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. 
As the petitioner, Gould bore the same burden of proof imposed upon a 
civil plaintiff. Paradis v. State, 110 Idaho 534,536,716 P.2d 1306, 1308 (1986); 
Esquivel v. State, 149 Idaho 255, 258 n.3, 233 P.3d 186, 189 n.3 (Ct. App. 
2010). If Gould believed appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a 
claim on appeal regarding the denial of his motion for a new trial, it was 
incumbent upon him to present evidence to the district court demonstrating why 
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counsel's failure to do so resulted in constitutionally ineffective assistance. 
Gould's only "evidence" on this point was his testimony that he thought the 
excessive sentence issue was "silly" and when he asked appellate counsel about 
other issues, appellate counsel said those issues were better-suited to post-
conviction. (Tr., p.51, L.5 - p.53, L.19.) 
The state, on the other hand, called appellate counsel as a witness and 
he testified that he reviewed the entire record and determined there were no 
viable issues to raise on appeal other than the sentencing issue, which is always 
an "arguable" claim. (See generally Tr., pp.105-130.) Gould disagrees and 
contends appellate counsel should have appealed "[t]he issue of prosecutorial 
misconduct as established and preserved through the mistrial and new trial 
motions" and the "issue of error in ruling on the IRE 403 motion."4 (Appellant's 
Brief, p.38.) When specifically asked about his decision not to challenge the 
denial of Gould's motion for a new trial, which encompassed the misconduct 
allegation and the Rule 403 issue, appellate counsel testified he did not 
challenge the court's ruling because he "found no error." (Tr., p.125, Ls.6-15.) 
Gould presented no evidence to support a finding that appellate counsel's 
decision not to raise the issue was based on ignorance of the law or lack of 
preparation or that he would have prevailed had the issue been raised. That 
current appellate counsel thinks the issue was worthy of consideration by an 
4 The "misconduct" and "IRE 403" issues were both encompassed within Gould's 
motion for a new trial. (#35797 R., pp.89-91.) Although Gould's brief is not 
entirely clear, it appears the only ineffective assistance of appellate counsel 
claim he is pursuing on appeal relates to appellate counsel's failure to appeal the 
denial of his motion for a new trial. (Appellant's Brief, pp.38-41.) 
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appellate court and has set forth the argument she would have raised does is not 
evidence and does not excuse Gould's failure to prove his claim before the 
district court. Moreover, that current appellate counsel would have made a 
different tactical decision does not mean counsel on direct appeal was 
objectively unreasonable in deciding which issues to raise. See Richter, 131 
S.Ct. at 788 ("Rare are the situations in which the wide latitude counsel must 
have in making tactical decisions will be limited to only one technique or 
approach.") (citation and quotations omitted); Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. 
1388 (2011) (quoting Strickland, supra) ("The Court acknowledged that '[t]here 
are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case,' and that 
'[e]ven the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in 
the same way."'). 
Gould has failed to show error in the dismissal of his ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel claim. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
judgment dismissing Gould's petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 20th day of February 2013. 
J S ICA M. LORELLO 
D p ty Attorney General 
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